





# Penguin WAK

**Gold Audit** 

Deep Scan Mode Screening

#### **Disclaimer**

Cognitos provides due-diligence project audits for various projects. Cognitos in no way guarantees that a project will not remove liquidity, sell off teamsupply, or otherwise exit scam.

Cognitos does the legwork and provides public information about the project in an easy-to-understand format for the common person.

Agreeing to an audit in no way guarantees that a team will not remove all liquidity ("Rug Pull"), remove liquidity slowly, sell off tokens, quit the project, or completely exit scam. There is also no way to prevent private sale holders from selling off their tokens. It is ultimately your responsibility to read through all documentation, social media posts, and contract code of each individual project to draw your own conclusions and set your own risk tolerance.

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### **Audit Scope**

Cognitos was comissioned by Penguin wak to perform an audit based on the following code:

https://bscscan.com/token/0x0b6d7735E0430D48675cba2955E87ccb0cD754cF#code

Note that we only audited the code available to us on this URL at the time of the audit. If the URL is not from any block explorer (main net), it may be subject to change. Always check the contract address on this audit report and compare it to the token you are doing research for.

#### **Audit Method**

Cognitos's manual smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. This process is conducted to discover errors, issues and security vulnerabilities in the code in order to suggest improvements and ways to fix them.

#### **Automated Vulnerability Check**

Cognitos uses software that checks for common vulnerability issues within smart contracts. We use automated tools that scan the contract for security vulnerabilities such as integer-overflow, integer-underflow, out-of-gas-situations, unchecked transfers, etc.

#### **Manual Code Review**

Cognitos's manual code review involves a human looking at source code, line by line, to find vulnerabilities. Manual code review helps to clarify the context of coding decisions. Automated tools are faster but they cannot take the developer's intentions and general business logic into consideration.



### **Project Overview**

Name & Logo



# **Penguin WAK**

**Project Statement**  Penguin innovations utilize blockchain technology alongside in-depth knowledge from its team to proffer solutions for effective management of finances in the crypto space. Backed by Decentralization and fully fledged DAO governance structure.

#### Website & **Social Media**

- Website
- Telegram
- Discord
- Twitter
- Medium
- Instagram
- Youtube

### https://penguintoken.site/ https://t.me/penguinwakk

https://twitter.com/penguintoken2 https://medium.com/@penguinwak

#### **Blockchain**

- Network
- Contract

Binance Smart Chain 0x0b6d7735E0430D48675cba2955E87ccb0cD754cF (verified)





#### **Token Data**

Token Symbol WAK

**Token Name** 

Penguin WAK

Contract Address

0x0b6d7735E0430D48675cba2955E87ccb0cD754cF

Compiler Version

v0.8.17+commit.8df45f5f

**Total Supply** 

100,000,000,000 WAK

**Decimals** 

18

Contract Creator

0x1012732040842aff8b7f8ef8767a4e7fe72da1bc

Contract Owner

0x8befb5fb7fa2db92a1e043559486d31c24bb648a



Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No



### **Security Detection**

#### **Risky Item**

#### **Attention** Item

### **X** 2









#### Contract Security


Contract Verified
Proxy Contract
Mint Function
Retrieves Ownership Function
Authority to Change Balance
Hidden Owner
Self-destruct Function
External Call Risk

#### Honeypot Risk

External Call Risk
Appear to be a Honeypot
Suspend Trading Function
Can Sell all of the Token
Can be Bought
Trading Cooldown Function
Anti_whale Function
Tax Modified Function
Blacklist Function
Whitelist Function
Personal Addresses Tax Changes

### **Vulnerability Summary**

#### Total Findings



#### Severity

- Critical
- Major
- Use Of Tx.origin
- Medium
- Incorrect Access Control
  Unchecked Array Length
  Deleting A Mapping Within A Struct
  Incorrect Shift Assembly
  Approve Front-running Attack
- Minor
- Internal Functions Never Used Outdated Compiler Version Use Of Floating Pragma Long Number Literals Missing Events
- Info
- Hard-coded Address Detected
  Unused Receive Fallback
  Missing Indexed Keywords In Events
  In-line Assembly Detected
  Require With Empty Message
  Block Values As A Proxy For Time
  Presence Of Overpowered Role

### **Vulnerability Scan**

#### **USE OF TX.ORIGIN**

Severity High Confidence Parameter Firm

# Vulnerability Description

In Solidity, **tx.origin** is a global variable that returns the address of the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for authorization could make a contract vulnerable. For example, if an authorized account calls a malicious contract which triggers it to call the vulnerable contract that passes an authorization check since **tx.origin** returns the original sender of the transaction which in this case is the authorized account.

# Scanning Line:

emit ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex, false, gas, tx.origin);

1633 emit ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex, true, gas, tx.origin);

### Recommen-dation:

**tx.origin** should not be used for authorization in smart contracts. It does have some legitimate use cases, for example, To prevent external contracts from calling the current contract, you can implement a require of the form **require(tx.origin == msg.sender)**. This prevents intermediate contracts from calling the current contract, thus limiting the contract to regular codeless addresses.

#### **Incorrect Access Control**

Severity Medium
Confidence Parameter Firm

# Vulnerability Description

Access control plays an important role in segregation of privileges in smart contracts and other applications. If this is misconfigured or not properly validated on sensitive functions, it may lead to loss of funds, tokens and in some cases compromise of the smart contract.

The contract **IUniswapV2Pair** is importing an access control library @open-zeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol but the function **burn** is missing the modifier **onlyRole**.

### Scanning Line:

.730 function burn(address to) external returns (uint amount0, uint amount1);

The contract **DividendPayingToken** is importing an access control library @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol but the function **withdrawD-ividend** is missing the modifier **onlyOwner**.

#### Scanning Line:

```
function withdrawDividend() public virtual override {
    _withdrawDividendOfUser(payable(msg.sender));
    }
```

The contract **TokenDividendTracker** is importing an access control library @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol but the function **process** is missing the modifier **onlyOwner**.

```
function process(uint256 gas) public returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) {

uint256 numberOfTokenHolders = tokenHoldersMap.keys.length;

if(numberOfTokenHolders == 0) {

return (0, 0, lastProcessedIndex);

}
```

```
1108
1109
         uint256 _lastProcessedIndex = lastProcessedIndex;
1110
        uint256 gasUsed = 0;
1111
1112
1113
        uint256 gasLeft = gasleft();
1114
        uint256 iterations = 0;
1115
1116
        uint256 claims = 0;
1117
1118
        while(gasUsed < gas && iterations < numberOfTokenHolders) {
           _lastProcessedIndex++;
1119
1120
          if(_lastProcessedIndex >= tokenHoldersMap.keys.length) {
1121
             _lastProcessedIndex = 0;
1122
           }
1123
1124
           address account = tokenHoldersMap.keys[_lastProcessedIndex];
1125
1126
           if(canAutoClaim(lastClaimTimes[account])) {
1127
             if(processAccount(payable(account), true)) {
1128
               claims++;
1129
1130
             }
1131
          }
1132
1133
           iterations++;
1134
           uint256 newGasLeft = gasleft();
1135
1136
           if(gasLeft > newGasLeft) {
1137
             gasUsed = gasUsed.add(gasLeft.sub(newGasLeft));
1138
           }
1139
1140
1141
          gasLeft = newGasLeft;
         }
1142
1143
1144
         lastProcessedIndex = _lastProcessedIndex;
1145
1146
         return (iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex);
1147
```

The contract **PenguinWAK** is importing an access control library @openzep-pelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol but the function **claim** is missing the modifier **onlyOwner**.

### Scanning Line:

```
1500 function claim() external {
1501 dividendTracker.processAccount(payable(msg.sender), false);
1502 }
```

The contract **TokenDividendTracker** is importing an access control library @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol but the function **MAPRemove** is missing the modifier **onlyOwner**.

#### Scanning Line:

```
function MAPRemove(address key) public {
1189
1190
         if (!tokenHoldersMap.inserted[key]) {
1191
          return;
        }
1192
1193
1194
         delete tokenHoldersMap.inserted[key];
         delete tokenHoldersMap.values[key];
1195
1196
1197
         uint index = tokenHoldersMap.indexOf[key];
1198
         uint lastIndex = tokenHoldersMap.keys.length - 1;
         address lastKey = tokenHoldersMap.keys[lastIndex];
1199
1200
         tokenHoldersMap.indexOf[lastKey] = index;
1201
1202
         delete tokenHoldersMap.indexOf[key];
1203
1204
         tokenHoldersMap.keys[index] = lastKey;
1205
         tokenHoldersMap.keys.pop();
1206
```

The contract **TokenDividendTracker** is importing an access control library @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol but the function **MAPSet** is missing the modifier **onlyOwner**.

### Scanning Line:

```
1178
      function MAPSet(address key, uint val) public {
         if (tokenHoldersMap.inserted[key]) {
1179
1180
           tokenHoldersMap.values[key] = val;
1181
        } else {
           tokenHoldersMap.inserted[key] = true;
1182
1183
           tokenHoldersMap.values[key] = val;
           tokenHoldersMap.indexOf[key] = tokenHoldersMap.keys.length;
1184
1185
           tokenHoldersMap.keys.push(key);
1186
1187
      }
```

The contract **PenguinWAK** is importing an access control library @openzep-pelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol but the function **processDividendTracker** is missing the modifier **onlyOwner**.

#### Scanning Line:

```
    function processDividendTracker(uint256 gas) external {
        (uint256 iterations, uint256 claims, uint256 lastProcessedIndex) = dividendTracker.pro cess(gas);
        emit ProcessedDividendTracker(iterations, claims, lastProcessedIndex, false, gas, tx.origin);
    }

    1498 }
```

# Recommen-dation:

It is recommended to go through the contract and observe the functions that are lacking an access control modifier. If they contain sensitive administrative actions, it is advised to add a suitable modifier to the same

#### **Unchecked Array Length**

Severity Medium
Confidence Parameter Tentative

# Vulnerability Description

Ethereum is a very resource-constrained environment. Prices per computational step are orders of magnitude higher than with centralized providers. Moreover, Ethereum miners impose a limit on the total number of Gas consumed in a block. If **array.length** is large enough, the function exceeds the block gas limit, and transactions calling it will never be confirmed.

for (uint256 i = 0; i < array.length; i++) { cosltyFunc(); }

This becomes a security issue, if an external actor influences **array.length**. E.g., if an array enumerates all registered addresses, an adversary can register many addresses, causing the problem described above.

# Scanning Line:

1377 for(uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {

# Recommen-dation:

Either explicitly or just due to normal operation, the number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit, which can cause the complete contract to be stalled at a certain point. Therefore, loops with a bigger or unknown number of steps should always be avoided.

#### **Deleting A Mapping Within A Struct**

Severity Medium
Confidence Parameter Tentative

# Vulnerability Description

The contract was found to be using a mapping (X) containing a struct (Y). This struct also contains another mapping (Z).

The vulnerability arises when the an item is deleted from mapping (X). This does not delete data from mapping (Z). The remaining data may compromise the contract

#### Scanning <u>Lin</u>e:

1194 delete tokenHoldersMap.inserted[key];
 1195 delete tokenHoldersMap.values[key];
 1202 delete tokenHoldersMap.indexOf[key];

### Recommen-dation:

A lock mechanism should be implemented instead of deletion to disable the struct containing the mapping.

#### **Incorrect Shift In Assembly**

Severity Medium
Confidence Parameter Tentative

# Vulnerability Description

Assembly usage in smart contracts should be done with utmost case as these statements bypass certain security checks and most of the times are more difficult to implement than a normal solidity code.

The shift statement in assembly (**shr**, **sar**, or **shl**) uses two parameters inside itself. The first argument defines the number of shifts and the second one defines the parameter on which the shift is to happen. These values should not be reversed as this will change the logic of the contract.

The contract is using shl(x,y) inside the assembly.

### Scanning Line:

214	mstore(add(ptr, 0x14), shl(0x60, implementation))	
232	mstore(add(ptr, 0x14), shl(0x60, implementation))	
252	mstore(add(ptr, 0x38), shl(0x60, deployer))	

### Recommen-dation:

It is recommended to go through the assembly usage in the code to make sure that the parameters passed in the shift operations used in the contract are in the correct order.

### Weakness Classification

		Al Scan	Human Review	Result
CTS 000	Function Default Visibility	•	•	Passed
CTS 001	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<b>/</b>	•	Passed
CTS 002	Outdated Compiler Version	<b>/</b>	<b>/</b>	Passed
CTS 003	Floating Pragma	LOW	•	Passed
CTS 004	Unchecked Call Return Value	~	•	Passed
CTS 005	Unprotected Ether With- drawal	•	•	Passed
CTS 006	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	~	•	Passed
CTS 007	Reentrancy	~	•	Passed
CTS 008	State Variable Default Visibility	~	•	Passed
CTS 009	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	~	•	Passed
CTS 010	Assert Violation	~	•	Passed
CTS 011	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	•	•	Passed
CTS 012	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	~	•	Passed
CTS 013	DoS with Failed Call	~	•	Passed
CTS 014	Transaction Order Dependence	~	•	Passed
CTS 015	Authorization through tx.origin	•	•	Passed
CTS 016	Block values as a proxy for time	~	•	Passed
CTS 017	Signature Malleability	•	~	Passed
CTS 018	Incorrect Constructor Name	<b>/</b>	•	Passed

		Al Scan	Human Review	Result
CTS 019	Shadowing State Variables	•	<b>/</b>	Passed
CTS 020	Weak Sources of Random- ness from Chain Attributes	~	~	Passed
CTS 021	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	~	•	Passed
CTS 022	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	~	•	Passed
CTS 023	Requirement Violation	~	•	Passed
CTS 024	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	~	•	Passed
CTS 025	Incorrect Inheritance Order	~	~	Passed
CTS 026	Insufficient Gas Griefing	~	~	Passed
CTS 027	Arbitrary Jump with Func- tion Type Variable	~	•	Passed
CTS 028	DoS With Block Gas Limit	~	•	Passed
CTS 029	Typographical Error	~	•	Passed
CTS 030	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	~	•	Passed
CTS 031	Presence of unused variables	~	•	Passed
CTS 032	Unexpected Ether balance	~	<b>/</b>	Passed
CTS 033	Hash Collisions With Multi- ple Variable Length Argu- ments	<b>/</b>	<b>/</b>	Passed
CTS 034	Message call with hardcod- ed gas amount	~	•	Passed
CTS 035	Code With No Effects	~	~	Passed
CTS 036	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	~	<b>~</b>	Passed



Critical



### **Website Security**

#### Security Detection

Minimal Low Security Risk Medium High

Our automated scan did not detect malware on your site.

#### Sitescan Report

http://penguintoken.site:80 Normalized URL Sun Mar 12 10:41:14 2023 Submission date 199.188.200.245 Server IP address Country **United States** Web Server LiteSpeed Malicious files 0 0 Suspicious files Potentially Suspicious files 0 Clean files 91 External links detected 265 Iframes scanned 21

No

# Scanned files analysis

Malicious files 0
Suspicious files 0
Potentially Suspicious files 0
Clean files 91

Blacklisted

#### Malware Checked

- No malware detected by scan (Low Risk)
- No injected spam detected (Low Risk)
- No defacements detected (Low Risk)
- No internal server errors detected (Low Risk)

#### Blacklist Checked

- Domain clean by Google Safe Browsing
- Domain clean by McAfee
- Domain clean by Sucuri Labs
- Domain clean by ESET
- Domain clean by PhishTank
- Domain clean by Yandex
- Domain clean by Opera



#### **SSL Checked**

- penguintoken.site resolves to 199.188.200.245
- The certificate should be trusted by all major web browsers
- The certificate was issued by Sectigo.
- The certificate will expire in 117 days.
- The hostname (penguintoken.site) is correctly listed in the certificate.

#### Server

Common name: penguintoken.site

SANs: penguintoken.site, www.penguintoken.site

Valid from July 6, 2022 to July 7, 2023

Serial Number: 7ebd2lf07840722679765809d10e2c4e Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA

#### Chain 1

Common name: Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA

Organization: Sectigo Limited

Location: Salford, Greater Manchester, GB

Valid from November 1, 2018 to December 31, 2030 Serial Number: 7d5b5126b476ba11db74160bbc530da7 Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption Issuer: USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

#### Chain 2

Common name: USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

Organization: The USERTRUST Network Location: Jersey City, New Jersey, US

Valid from March 11, 2019 to December 31, 2028

Serial Number: 3972443af922b751d7d36c10dd313595 Signature Algorithm: sha384WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: AAA Certificate Services



#### Technology Profiler

CMS WordPress 6.1.1

Blogs WordPress 6.1.1

Miscellaneous Webpack 50% sure

Module Federation 50% sure

Web servers LiteSpeed

Programming languages PHP

Databases MySQL

Page builder Elementor 3.11.3

WordPress plugins Elementor 3.11.3

WP-Optimize

Performance WP-Optimize



#### **Team Data**

#### **Dev & Team Informations**

**Denis Lukavackic** 

Damir Lukavačkić

We found developer and team information on the website



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Cognitos Project Audit has been completed for **Penguin WAK - BSC** 

Block number: 0000078



This result is only valid if viewed on www.cognitos.io



